Excellencies, Ambassador Gafoor,
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is grateful for the opportunity to participate in this final substantive session of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs).
At the outset, we would like to express our appreciation to the Chair’s team, and to this working group, for the extraordinary effort to negotiate a final report.
Today, there are over 130 armed conflicts around the world. ICT activities are an integral part of many of these conflicts. You – the delegations in this room – have the important task of building common understandings on the international legal rules that limit malicious ICT activities, prevent escalation and new wars, and protect civilian populations against harm if conflict erupts.
This OEWG has done an unprecedented job in setting out today’s ICT threats. The ICRC can attest that many of these exact threats materialize in today’s armed conflicts.
Over the past five years, our colleagues in countries affected by armed conflicts have documented cyber operations aimed at disrupting or destroying essential services for civilian populations, such as electricity networks; water treatment facilities; communication systems, as well as medical activities or humanitarian operations. These operations put the lives and well-being of civilian populations in danger.
We particularly commend you for reflecting this reality in the draft final report, including paragraph 21, which expresses concern about malicious ICT activities targeting humanitarian organizations.
Excellencies,
In light of these acute threats, we encourage all delegations to do their utmost to uphold the existing consensus to protect civilians and other protected persons and objects in situations of armed conflict, including against malicious ICT activities.
The ICRC sees great value in paragraphs 38-41 of the draft report, which reference the multiple agreements that States have reached on the application of international law, including international humanitarian law, to the use of ICTs.
This OEWG has provided a central platform for such discussions, building on the work of several Groups of Government Experts (GGE) and the last OEWG as well as other important processes, such as the International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.
Through global, regional, and cross-regional cooperation, we today have overwhelming agreement to a humanitarian red-line in the use of ICTs: IHL prohibits to attack civilian objects, to target hospitals, to launch indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks, including in the use of ICTs.
During this final week of intergovernmental negotiations, the ICRC calls on all delegations to reflect this humanitarian red-line in the final report.
As said by many delegations in this working group, additional discussions are needed to ensure that IHL is effectively applied to the use of ICTs in armed conflict.
Whether this is done by building common understandings on existing law, or through an additional legally binding instrument, such negotiations must not cast doubt or undermine the existing legal protection for civilian populations affected by armed conflict.
The ICRC stands ready to support states in any future discussions concerning the use of ICTs in situations of armed conflict. In this regard, we wish to echo the joint statement by Mexico, Luxembourg, and Switzerland earlier this week, and draw your attention to the ICT Workstream of the Global Initiative to Galvanize Political Commitment to International Humanitarian Law.
Complementing existing multilateral processes, this workstream provides a dedicated humanitarian space for in-depth exchanges aimed at fostering a shared understanding on how IHL protects civilian populations against the dangers arising from ICT activities during armed conflicts.
Mr. Chair,
Once again, the ICRC commends your excellent work over the past five years, and wishes this working group great success in adopting a strong report with a clear humanitarian message that no state will dispute: in times of armed conflict, malicious cyber operations must not be directed against civilian infrastructure.
Thank you.
We acknowledge Source link for the information.